Sursa
Who’s to blame for Saab going bankrupt in december 2011? Well, thats the question many people have asked. We have been very restrictive in placing blame on anyone, especially the obvious ones as GM that so many wanted to blame. But to blame someone you really need a reason, a real reason with firm facts behind it. In the world of human resource management we learn that mistakes and catastrophes created by man, does not happen simply by one single thing or one single event. It is always a series of events and issues which lead to the end, in this case resulting in bankruptcy.
So why did it happen? I have for the past year and a half been in contact with more people than I can remember who all have an issue. That issue could be to blame someone, to tell the real story or to influence what we could call the truth. Now this is a touchy subject because the truth depends on who you talk to and how this person has perceived what he / she thinks is the truth, simple principle of relativity. Things are perceived differently by each person and based on what kind of information that person holds. As an outsider looking in, we rely upon the stories we’re being told. These stories are told by people who were there but may or may not have understood what they saw in in the right way. These people also connect their dots depending on what pre-conceptions and information they had prior to the events they experienced actually took place which in term affects their interpretation of events.
I’ll tell you right now this story will be in several sections starting from what I as a writer feel is the start of events until what I experienced first hand together with so many others at the end of 2011. We will probably be portrayed somewhat as a Saab haters because this is in no way a nice story, its is a story of mistakes made and we’re writing this story because it is our interpretation of the truth. But what to remember that this story is also a live document which will change over time as new information is revealed to us. The reason for writing this story is to make sure that lessons are learned, that mistakes are not repeated and that we can understand what really happened and understand the series of events which at the end lead to the death of Saab Automobile in december 2011. If there ever was a chance to create a document with lessons learned, the time is now…
In order to get information we must present information and we hope that people will get in touch with us and present their views on what happened. We will of course examine this new information and compare it what we already have heard and in such build up the real story of Saab. But to do this we need to lay the groundwork and that is starting today.
With every major write-up or whenever you want to teach someone something, you must always start with a fundamental thing you want to achieve, in our case, we want to answer the question why did Saab fail?. Its a huge and difficult question but we believe to have come fairly close to understanding most of the issues around this.
We start the story in the early 90′s. In the late 80′s most smaller car companies were being bought up by big ones, it was what one might call a buying frenzy where big companies were competing with each other on which company could absorb the most amount of resources and know-how. Saab was bought to 50% by GM (the other 50% being owned by Investor, in turn owned by the Wallenberg family), it was perhaps not a very thought through purchase but anyway it was done. Without going too much into details Saab was approached by GM in which GM asked Saab what they wanted to do and how that was to be done and cost?
The outline of these meetings resulted in four model series called project 102, 104, 106 and 108. The 102 was supposed to be a small car, roadster and a new version of the Saab Sonett. The 104 was supposed to be a 900 replacement, aimed for the normal family of 4, a car that would later become the new 900 which was already in early development. The 106 was the replacement of the recently introduced Saab 9000 series and the 108 was a much bigger more luxurious car, within the lines of Volvo’s S80 project.
The manager of Saab which was brought into Saab by GM was David Herman (1990-1992) who had served as Senior Executive positions throughout the world, including the Commonwealth of Independent States. He served with General Motors for 29 years, including 10 years as a Vice-President and as Chairman of the board of Adam Opel AG and represented General Motors in a number of countries. His most impressive achievement was as Director of RAND Corp. which is a company highly linked with US intelligence and military organizations.
Whomever I ask I always get the same response, David was a guy who really took his job seriously. He moved to Trollhättan and lived there full time. He tried to really understand what Saab was all about and made it his business to get Saab on the right track to profitability. Now this is a key word, profits. This is the word that is the most significant within any company. The aim of each company is to earn as much money as possible, to make as much profits as possible. Saab was in the business of making money, through making cars which we drive and enjoy!
GM having a lot more experience with production early on saw several issues with Saab that GM could improve, production efficiency was one of them, but the big problem was over-spending budgets. One thing that was joked about at Saab but certainly was no joke to GM who now had to pay the bills were that Saab wanted to do it the Saab way. GM saw this as Saab re-inventing the wheel every time something was supposed to be done simply because the people at Saab had an attitude of being better than everyone else. This is not something particular to Saab but I think at the time it was a public health issue for everyone in Sweden. Sweden was prospering, it was one of the richer countries in the world, with a health and education system that could not easily be rivaled by anyone, poverty was almost erased completely. So naturally there was a certain sense of national-pride among its people and the ones in the swedish business-world. In my mind this attitude was not something people at GM with world-wide experience cared for much. Working in different cultures one is bound to meet this kind of attitude to a certain degree regardless of where you go, being able to handle it is a different matter.
In any sense Saab was over-spending their budget and David who had done a superb job at Saab decided together with GM’s management that someone else should be brought it to make some hard decision. Keith Butler Wheelhouse entered the stage in 1992 and he had one mission, make sure Saab becomes profitable. At the time the european market was downsizing their products, most major car-makers had smaller cars in development and every company sort of had to profile themselves for what they wanted to be in the future. Some did like Subary and specialized themselves as terrain vehicles, some focused on average-middle class cars, mostly smaller, some went all premium but nobody stayed dangling in the middle not really knowing where to go, except Saab and Volvo. The market in Scandinavia was very different compared with the rest of Europe, which in turn had a huge impact on the decisions made in the early 90′s. Volvo was developing the S80 line and Saab being the most natural competitor of Volvo decided to go on the same line.
Saab was due to the economic situation at the company, roughly caused by over-spending, low sales numbers and the worsening economic situation in the world was given a choice, either we pursue a smaller car, the 102, which was completed up to a point where base, interior and exterior was close to the pencils down stage (the point where the car leaves design and enters technical development). Or pursue the bigger and much more luxurious 108 project which was what Volvo was doing, however which was the complete opposite compared to what the rest of Europe was doing. The Scandinavian market was not too influenced by the European market at the time, most cars were gasoline and bigger models which were considered safer. Saab’s main qualities at the time was safety and it was established that the 102 project could not, with the technology available at the time become profitable with the safety standards that Saab wanted to achieve associated with the production costs required by building the car in Trollhättan. The issue of producing the car at a place where production costs would be less was on the table but was rejected by the Swedish group in the management board of Saab. “If its not built in Trollhättan, its not a real Saab” was the general tone o time. So the 102 project came to an end…
To be continued…